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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. 
Did the majority decision of the panel of the Utah Court of 
Appeals err in holding that the arresting officer, acting under 
the mistaken belief that the driver of the vehicle was a person 
whom he had reason to believe did not have a valid license to 
operate a motor vehicle, did not exceed the scope and purpose of 
the initial stop in requesting that the driver, who he knew was 
not the person originally suspected of driving, produce his 
driver's license without any independent suspicion that the driver 
or the passenger had been or was about to engage in any illegal 
activity. 
II. 
Did the opinion of the majority of the panel of the Utah 
Court of Appeals misapply the law in holding that even though the 
arresting officer initially detained the defendants against their 
will, there was no evidence that the defendants were so detained 
at the point in time when the arresting officer asked to see the 
driver's license of defendant, Steven Murphy. 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The panel of the Utah Court of Appeals in a two to one 
unpublished decision dated March 18, 1988 affirmed the decision of 
the trial court in denying defendants' motion to suppress. 
Defendants petitioned for a rehearing which was denied by an order 
dated May 6, 1988. 
1 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah State Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this 
latter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated/ Section 78-2-2 (3)(a). 
The decision of the panel of the Utah Court of Appeals is 
lated March 18# 1988. Defendants thereafter petitioned for a 
ehearing which was denied by an order dated May 6, 1988. The 
rder granting an extension of time to file this petition with the 
bove-entitled court is dated June 3# 1988. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects# against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated..." 
Article I., Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated..." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendants filed a motion to suppress in the trial court. 
lis motion was denied and defendant, Darrell Murphy, was 
tereafter convicted of illegal possession of alcohol and 
fendant, Steven Murphy, was convicted of driving under the 
fluence and driving on suspension. Defendants thereafter filed 
notice of appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. The panel of the 
ah Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions with one judge 
ssenting. Defendants thereafter filed a petition for rehearing 
ich was denied. Defendants now petition the Supreme Court of 
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the State of Utah for a writ of certiorari. 
The facts upon which the parties rely for this petition are 
contained in a written narative by the arresting officer which was 
made part of the record in the trial court and a copy of which is 
included in the appendix hereto. 
On October 3, 1986 the arresting officer received a radio 
call from another police officer. This second officer stated that 
he had seen the vehicle owned by defendant, Darrell Murphy, and 
that he believed that Darrell was driving. The second officer 
also informed the arresting officer that Darrell's operator's 
license was suspended. The arresting officer went to the area 
where the vehicle had been seen; and observed the vehicle. The 
officer called the dispatcher and verified that in fact Darrell1s 
license was suspended. The officer then states that as the 
vehicle was making a turn in front of him, his headlights 
illuminated the interior of the vehicle and specifically the 
driver's face. At this point it appeared to him that the driver 
was in fact Darrell Murphy. The officer then stopped the vehicle 
and approached the driver's side window. Upon seeing the driver, 
the officer realized that he was mistaken in his belief that the 
driver was Darrell. The driver of the vehicle was defendant, 
Steven Murphy, Darrell's older brother. Darrell Murphy was in 
fact seated in the passenger side. The officer explained the 
reason for the stop, ie. his belief that Darrell was driving the 
car, to which Darrell responded, "I know I'm on suspension, that's 
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why he is driving". The officer then asked Steven to produce his 
license# to which Steven replied that he did not have his license 
with him. The officer then proceeded back to his patrol car to 
check the status of Steven's license. The report came back that 
Steven was also on suspension. Upon returning to the defendants' 
vehicle the officer stated that he noticed a smell of alcohol 
coming from Steven's breath; and later a similar odor from 
Darrell's breath. Based upon this suspicion, further 
Investigation resulted in the arrest of both defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
The majority decision of the panel of the Utah Court of 
ppeals is in conflict with a decision of the above-entitled Court 
n holding that the arresting officer was justified in continuing 
3 detain the defendants despite the fact that the purpose of the 
top had already been effectuated. 
The majority in its opinion, dated March 18, 1988, states: 
"The purpose of the stop was not fulfilled when 
Steven was found to be the driver. The purpose of the 
stop was not fulfilled when Steven was asked but failed 
to produce his operator's license. The purpose was 
fulfilled only when the officer contacted the dispatcher 
and discovered the status of the operator's license. The 
officer was at all time acting within the proper scope of 
the stop..." 
This court in State v* Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah, 1987) 
:>ting from United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 
34) states: 
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• . „ i. officer may seize a pt-ic^ w .1 tju- >£ficer 
has an articulable suspicion that the person has mitted 
or is about to commit a crime; however, the detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop" 'emphasis added). 
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The decision of the Court of Appeals attempts to avoid the 
conflict with Deitman# by holding that the officer was acting 
within the scope and purpose of the initial stop and therefore did 
not detain the defendants longer than was necessary to effectute 
the purpose thereof* This is to say that# according to the 
majority decision, demanding the license of defendant Steven 
Murphy was somehow a part of the reason that the officer made the 
inital stop. Again the majority is in conflict with the holding 
in Deitman. The holding in Deitman# is that "an officer may seize 
a person if the officer has an articulable suspicion that the 
person has committed or is about to commit a crime". The officer 
lad absolutely no objective basis to suspect that Steven Murphy 
lad been or was about to engage in a crime. The only information 
hat the officer had was about Darrell Murphy. How then could the 
urpose of the stop have included investigating Steven or his 
icense to operate a vehicle. The officer did not even know or 
aspect that Steven was in the vehicle when he stopped it. 
Lkewise, at the time that the officer requested that Steven 
roduce his license, he had no suspicion from an independent 
>urce that Steven had been or was about to engage in any crime. 
t the case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed. 
I 889 (1968) the United States Supreme Court stated that: 
"A search which is reasonable at its inception may 
violate the fourth amendment by virtue of its intolerable 
intensity and scope; the scope of the search must be strictly 
tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its 
initiation permissible." 
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"The officer, therefore, is properly standing 
1 i I vehicle* Absent any suspicion, Deitman permits the 
officer to ask questions of the driver so long as the driver 
is not detained against his will. An examination of the 
narrative fails to show <tu\ indication of detention." 
Tt i ,<, s-ourt- in Slide v. Dei Una nr supra, again quoLiiiy I " " i", united 
States \i. Merritt, stij'»i" i . I i M kh ; 
"....an officer may approach a citizen at anytime and 
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cooperation with the officer's investigation, but 
because he believes he ! ^  ' *.--- +.. i.-^ w,
 n seizmc 
occurs . " •'= • 
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In United States y^ Espinosa-Guerra, 805 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 
1986) the court stated: 
"There are three tiers of police-citizen encounters 
with respect to Fourth Amendment; police-citizen 
communications involving no coercion or detention, which 
do not implicate Fourth Amendment scrutiny, brief 
seizures involving reasonably brief encounters in which 
reasonable person would have believed that he or she 
was not free to leavey which require showing by 
government of reasonable articulable suspicion that 
person has committed or is about commit crime, and full 
scale arrests# which are more intrusive encounters 
requiring probable cause." (emphasis added). 
rhe court should have applied this "reasonable person" test to 
ietermine if the defendants were detained against their will. It 
/ould appear that the majority did not. The facts are that the 
irresting officer stopped the defendants vehicle at approximately 
1:25 pm.# presumably through some audio and/or visual signal. 
here is no question that this was against the will of defendants. 
he officer next proceeded to the driver's side where he realized 
hat the driver was Steven and that Darrell was seated in the 
assenger side. The officer next explained to defendants the 
sason for the stop; and then requested that Steven produce a 
river's license. When Steven could not# the officer requested 
le necessary information from Steven with which to call dispatch 
> check the license. Applying the "reasonable person" test then, 
>uld a reasonable person in the position of defendants, believe 
tat he or she was at any point free to leave. The majority 
dnion would seem to indicate that the detention ended somewhere 
tween the officer recognizing Steven as the driver and Darrell 
8 
as the passenger, and the officer asking Steven for his license. 
Would a reasonable person have believed that he or she was free to 
leave at this point in time? Should the defendants have 
reasonably believed that they were free to simply roll up the 
window and drive away unhindered? And if so, what specific fact 
could a reasonable person point to as the indication that he or 
she was no longer required to remain? What indication did the 
officer give that the defendants were free to leave? Obviously, 
a reasonable person would not have believed that he or she was 
free to leave. The officer gave no indication, spoken or 
otherwise, that the detention he had just effected, under the 
color of his authority as a peace officer, was at an end. A 
reasonable person would have believed that he or she was required 
to do exactly what the defendants did, remain and respond. 
The majority also seems to be misapplying the standard of 
Deitman, supra. Deitman, involved a situation where the officer 
asked the suspects if they would mind speaking with him. The 
suspects voluntarily crossed the street to meet the officer and 
produced identification when requested. There had been no prior 
detention of the suspects as was the case with defendants. 
Defendants do no claim that what is initially a detention against 
will cannot evolve into something less; but there would seem to 
have to be some point in time where a reasonable person would 
believe that he or she was free to go and voluntarily choose to 
remain. This is clearly not the case with defendants. The 
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defendants could not have reasonably believed that they were free 
to leave after the officer had stopped their vehicle and 
approached on the driver's side; and consequently they were in 
fact still being detained against their will. 
POINT III. 
The real issue in this case is one which should be decided by 
the above-entitled court. 
The facts of this case suggest that the real issue is whether 
or not an officer may request to see the driver's license of a 
person who he has already detained for another reason. The United 
States Supreme Court in the case of Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979) has held that the mere 
fact that a person is operating a motor vehicle does not justify 
an officer to detain the person to determine if he/she is 
operating with a valid license. See also State v. Ochoa, 544 P.2d 
1097 (Arizona 1976) and Commonwealth v. Swanger, 307 A.2d 875 
(Pennsylvania 1973). In this case the defendants were already 
detained due to the mistaken belief of the officer as to the 
identity of the driver. Even though the officer did not need to 
request Steven's license to determine that he was not the person 
he thought him to be at first glance, was the officer justified in 
asking Steven for his license because of the requirement that all 
persons operating a motor vehicle in the state have a valid 
license, Utah Code Annotated, Section 41-2-104. Once again 
quoting from the Deitman, this court has already held that: 
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"...an officer may seize a person if the officer 
has an articulable suspicion that the person has committed 
or is about to commit a crime; however, the detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop." 
To allow an officer to continue to detain a motorist in order to 
determine whether or not he/she is operating with a valid license, 
despite the lack of any articulable suspicion of wrongdoing, would 
seem to be in conflict with the established position of this 
court. In any event, this is clearly a decision which is of such 
importance that it should be made by this court. 
DATED this ^Vc day of July, 1988. 
Tchae 1 L. Mi 1 le*^ 
'Attorney for Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact copies of 
the foregoing to the attorney for Respondent, postage prepaid, at; 
Ben H. Hadfield 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box "F" 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
DATED this ^%^ day of July, 1988, 
1 L Midler 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Brigham City, ) 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) OPINION 
) (Not For Publication) 
v. ) 
Darrell R. Murphy and ) Case No. 870299-CA 
Steven W. Murphy, ) 
Defendants and Appellants. ) 
Before Judges Bench, Davidson and Jackson. 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Defendant Darrell Murphy, a minor, was convicted of 
illegal consumption of alcohol. Defendant Steven Murphy was 
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and driving 
on a suspended license. Both appeal. 
No record was provided to this Court, the parties having 
agreed to "rely on" a written narrative by the arresting 
officer to state the facts. We, therefore, treat the narrative 
with the same consideration as the trial record. 
At approximately 11:25 p.m. on October 3, 1986, the 
reporting officer stopped a vehicle belonging to defendant 
Darrell Murphy. The stop was based upon the suspicion that 
Darrell was driving on suspension, evidently he being known to 
the police. The officer stopped the vehicle and discovered 
that the driver was defendant Steven Murphy, the older brother 
of Darrell. Both brothers "look extremely similar." Upon 
request by the officer, Steven was unable to produce an 
operator's license. The officer then contacted the dispatcher 
to check the license and was told that Steven's license had 
been suspended and that the registration of the vehicle had 
expired. Upon return to the vehicle the officer detected the 
odor of alcohol from Steven. Further investigation resulted in 
Steven being charged with driving under the influence and 
Darrell with illegal consumption of alcohol. 
On appeal the defendants admit that the stop of the 
vehicle was justified. They argue, however, that once it was 
F I L E D 
AR 
Timothy n thyMIStea ^J ***** 
CtorWofttW Court 
Utah Conrfof Appe»te 
determined that Steven and not Darrell was driving/ the officer 
had no justification to continue to detain the defendants or to 
ask to see Steven's driver's license. 
Both sides agree that the basis for the stop of the 
vehicle was proper. That basis was to determine if the driver, 
who was thought to be Darrell# was properly licensed pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-104 (1987),* which requires that all 
operators of motor vehicles upon the highways of the state be 
licensed. The question then is whether the officer acted 
outside the purpose or scope of the stop. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 41-2-124 (1987)2 requires all drivers to have an operator's 
license in their possession when operating a motor vehicle and 
to display it on demand of a peace officer. The purpose of the 
stop was not fulfilled when Steven was found to be the driver. 
The purpose was not fulfilled when Steven was asked but failed 
to produce his operator's license. The purpose was fulfilled 
only when the officer contacted the dispatcher and discovered 
the status of the operator's license. The officer was at all 
times acting within the proper scope of the stop and 
investigation or pursuant to further suspicions arising from 
the investigation. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 
(Utah 1987) described the three levels of permissible police 
contact with the public. 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his 
will; (2) an officer may seize a person if 
the officer has an "articulable suspicion" 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-104. 
(1) No person, except one expressly exempted under 
§ 41-2-107, 41-2-108, or 41-2-111, or Subsection 
41-2-121(4), or Chapter 22, Title 41, may operate a motor 
vehicle on a highway in this state unless the person is 
licensed as an operator by the division under this chapter. 
No claim has been raised that either defendant is exempted under 
any section of the Utah Code. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-124. 
(1) The licensee shall have his license in his immediate 
possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and 
shall display it upon demand of a justice of peace, a 
peace officer, or a field deputy or inspector of the 
division. 
860299-CA 2 
that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the "detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect 
if the officer has probable cause to believe 
an offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
Id. at 617-18 (quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 
230 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
We are not concerned with the stop since it was concededly 
valid. The officer, therefore, is properly standing beside the 
vehicle. Absent any suspicion, Deitman permits the officer to 
ask questions of the driver so long as the driver is not 
detained against his will. An examination of the narrative 
fails to show any indication of detention. This Court will not 
find such detention through supposition and speculation based 
upon unknown testimony in an absent record. 
Absent some showing that defendants were detained against 
their will, the officer acted properly in requesting to see 
Steven's driver's license. Since such questioning led to the 
discovery of facts which gave rise to additional articuable 
suspicion of other crimes, the officer was justified in 
proceeding. 
The convictions of both defendants are affirmed. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
860299-CA 3 
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correct copy of the foregoing OPINION was mailed or personally 
delivered to each of the above parties. 
mK 
Kar^n Bean 
Case Management Clerk 
UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
Brigham City, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Darrell R. Murphy and 
Steven W. Murphy, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
ORDER 
No. 870299-CA 
This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for 
Rehearing filed by the appellant. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's petition for 
rehearing is denied. 
FOR THE COURT: 
// h 
Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 6th day of May, 1988, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed to each of the 
following: 
Michael L. Miller 
Attorney for Appellants 
20 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 399 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
Ben Hadfield 
Phillip W. Hadfield 
Mann, Hadfield & Thorne 
Attorneys at Law 
98 North Main 
P.O. Box "F-
Brigham City, UT 84302 
Hon. Robert Daines 
First Circuit Court 
Brigham City Department 
#86CM279A21, 86TF373MA21, 86TF372MA21 
/ 
- -~r ,-.. 
Julia C.Xwhitfield 
Case Management Clerk 
FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT 
BRIGHAM CITY, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ] 
DARRELL R. MURPHY and ) 
STEVEN W. MURPHY, J 
Defendants. ] 
» DECISION 
i Case no: 86 
> 86 
} 86 
CM 
TF 
TF 
279A21 
373MA21 
372MA21 
The Court hereby denies the Defendant's motion to 
Suppress. 
DATED this / iT^ day of January, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
Id 
Stanton M. Taylor 
Circuit Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the 
foregoing Decision to Ben H. Hadfield, Attorney at Law, 98 North 
Main, Brigham City, Utah 84302-0906 and Michael L. Miller, 
Attorney at Law 20 South Main, Brigham City, Utah 84302 this /*&& 
day of January 1987. 
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723-3421 
6 O H t N S t 
9400 Drunk D r i v i n g 
7 LOCATION OF O C C U M f N O 
200 South 700 East Brigham City 
9 DATE Of OCCURRENCE '0 HMf Or OCCURRENCE l» DATE REPORTED 
M
°ld-03-86j 2325 JTo-^ -ge 
•4 OFFICERS TIME-
1 hr 45 min 
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25 min 
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STIVER, Jeff SGT Patrol 2C8 
S OF COMPLAINT: 
-60 on AER117 at 200 South and 700 East. 
1971 Dodg Darrell Murphy 1062 Sycamore Brigham City 0686 ) 
.s OF INVESTIGATION- IDENTIFICATION' SEC'l ION: 
REST DATA #1: 
me: MURPHY, Steven Wayne 
B/Age: 02-01-65 / 21 
ce/Sex: Cauc./Male 
ere was arrestee booked: BESO 
tation #'s: 63841 & 14790 
ARREST DATA #2: 
Name: MURPHY, Darrell R. 
DOB/Age: 01-13-67 / 19 
Race/Sex: Cauc/Male 
Where was arrestee booked: BESO 
Citation #: 14739 
EMENTS OF THE INVESTIGATION: 
OTHER OFFENSES - CUE CARD #10 
Breifly describe the offense: 
Describe the location: Approx. 
Driving under the influence of alcohol, Driving on Suspensilo: 
and illegal possesssion of alcohol. 
210 South on 700 East Brigham City 
List other pertinent data: Intoxilyzer Test Results: #1 - .122 BAC & #2 - .07o/, BAC 
OFFICERS NARRATIVE: Officer L. Ludwig and Officer D. Johnsen had just cleared from a 
traffic stop in the area of 700 East and 300 South. While at that 
)eation Officers had observed a vehicle belonging to Darrell Murphy stop in the area and 
jm off the lights. The occupants stayed in the vehicle. Officer Johnsen stated he believeq'c 
irrell Murphy was driving the car. Officer Ludwig and Johnsen were now enrcute to another 
ill and notified R/0. R/0 checked with BCPD Dispatch, which confirmed that Darrell Murphy 
ad a suspended Drivers License , which was the information passed onto R/0 from Officer D. 
ahnsen earlier. R/0 arrived in the area and observed the subject vehicle, a Gold 1971 Dodge 
harger UT AER117 turn in front of R/O's patrol vehicle north on 700 East from 300 South . 
t appeared to R/0 as the subject vehicle turned in front of R/O's patrol vehicle, and as 
he headlights from R/O's vehicle and the street light iluminated the driver, that it was .. 
arrell Murphy driving the vehicle. R/0 stopped the vehicle at approx. 210 South on 700 = 4-i-
ast. The driver of the vehicle 
as Steven W. Murphy, the older 
TOTAl TIMf ALL OFflCEIS GATHERING AND REPORTING D A I A 
(CONT on 102 Form 2 hr 10 mini 
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ROOKED AT DATE ROOKED •OOKCD BY DISTRIBUTION P A G I _ 
£6NTIMJATI6N OR F6LL6W-UP 
UNIFORM INCIDENT/OFFENSE REPORT BCPDForm 102 
1. ioftinoM. Victim or Comoioinont 
•"B.C.P.P. ( J Johnson) 
2 C O M N O 
86-08169 
• • p o r t i n g Agoncy 4 (0 No 
Brighom City Police Department 20100 
3 Typo OHomo 
9400 Drunk Driving 
4 OHicor 10 (Chock c 
2&1 Continuation KX Follow-up LJ 
OFFICERS NARRATIVE CONT.: brother of Darrell Murphy. Darrell Murphy was sitting in 
the front passenger seat. It should be noted that both 
subjects being brothers, look extremely similar. R/0 explained the nature of the stop 
to arrestees, and Darrell Murphy stated, "I know I'm on suspension, thats why hes 
driving.11 R/0 took the information from Driver/Arrestee #1 as he did not have a Driver^ 
License in his possession and checked Drivers License Status with BCPD Dispatch. R/0 
was informaed that Arrestee #1/Driver was also on Suspension Type 0 and that the DL 
had expired in February of 1985. Also during this time it was ascertained by Officer 
that the registration of subject vehicle was over 90 days expired (6 of 86). R/0 
retrned to subject vehicle and began explaining the circumstances to Arrestee #1/Drivef, 
when R/0 detected the odor of alcohol coming from arrestee #l's breath. R/0 asked 
arrestee if he had been drinking and Arrestee replied "Yeah, I've had a couple, but 
I'm OK." Arrestee then stated "I can pass your tests. Do you want to give them to me?" 
R/0 requested arrestee #1 to step from the vehicle onto the sidewalk. Arrestee #1 was 
asked to perform several sobriety tests and attempted to do so. Arrestee did not 
perfomr the sobriety test satisfactorily and was placed under arrest. Sgt. Stiver 
arrived during the sobriety tests and assisted R/0. Arrestee #2 was then asked to step 
from the vehicle as he was the registered owner of the vehicle. R/0 asked Arrestee #2 
if he had been drinking, to which Arrestee #2 replied "Yeah, but not much." R/0 could j 
detect an odor of alcohol coming from Arrestee #2's breath also. Due to the fact that j 
Arrestee #2 was only 19 yoa, Arrestee #2 was placed under arrest for Illegal Possessiorj 
3f Alcohol. Both Arrestee were transported to BESO and given Intoxilyzer Tests and I 
looked. Arrestee #1 was booked for DUI, Driving on Suspension and Possession of Para-
phernalia. The paraphamalia was located by Jailer Phenes during a search while at 
;he Jail. The paraphernalia was booked into evidence by R/0, for testing. Arrestee #1 
/as booked for Illegal Possession of Alcohol. Sat. Stiver stayed with the vehicle and 
;tate impounded the vehicle. The vehicle was towed to/by Davis Dodge. No further actiorj 
'as taken at this tire. 
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